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  Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior Judge of the United*
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
sitting by designation.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
POLLAK, District Judge
Eight years ago, this case, pending in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey, was certified as a
class action.  Three years ago, the District Court decertified the
class in an opinion stressing the inadequacies of then-class
counsel.  After plaintiffs-appellants obtained new counsel, they
moved to recertify the class.  The District Court denied that
motion, and plaintiffs brought this interlocutory appeal.  Because
the District Court failed to apply the correct standards in ruling
on the motion for recertification, we will vacate and remand.
I.
In 2000, a light bulb manufacturer known as DuroTest
closed.  Thereafter, plaintiffs, former DuroTest employees, filed
suit in New Jersey federal court against  companies affiliated
with DuroTest and against Robert Sorensen, the Chief Executive
Officer of those companies.  Plaintiffs seek damages for alleged
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C.
§ 201 et seq., the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., the Worker Adjustment
and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq., and
New Jersey state law.  On May 20, 2002, the District Court
certified the case as a class action, and in December 2005, a
different District Judge denied the parties’ cross-motions for
summary judgment.
3In February 2006, the parties consented to have a
magistrate judge conduct all further proceedings in the case, and
on August 22, 2006, United States Magistrate Judge Hedges
limited the membership of plaintiffs’ FLSA and ERISA classes
to individuals who had previously responded to a questionnaire
mailed by class counsel.  In February 2007, however, Judge
Hedges decertified the class in its entirety, citing numerous
mistakes made by class counsel, including the failure to send
class notice pursuant to Rule 23(c)(2)(B).
On October 3, 2007, plaintiffs’ counsel filed a notice of
withdrawal, and new counsel for the plaintiffs filed an entry of
appearance.  United States Magistrate Judge Cecchi approved
the substitution of counsel by order dated December 10, 2007. 
After a settlement conference on February 13, 2008, plaintiffs
moved to recertify the class.  Judge Cecchi denied the
recertification motion in an opinion and order dated April 4,
2008, holding that plaintiffs’ newly-substituted counsel had
continued the pattern of errors and omissions that had marred
prior counsel’s representation of the class.  This interlocutory
appeal followed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) and
Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and we
review the District Court’s ruling on recertification for abuse of
discretion.  See Beck v. Maximus, Inc., 457 F.3d 291, 295 (3d
Cir. 2006).
II.
 Although questions concerning the adequacy of class
counsel were traditionally analyzed under the aegis of the
adequate representation requirement of Rule 23(a)(4) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, those questions have, since
2003, been governed by Rule 23(g).  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g),
2003 Advisory Committee Note.  That rule instructs that “a court
that certifies a class must appoint class counsel.”  Id. 23(g)(1). 
Thus, under the plain language of the rule, a district court’s
decision to certify a class must precede the appointment of class
counsel.
4The rule lists four factors that must be considered once a
district court proceeds to the stage of appointing class counsel:
“the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating
potential claims in the action,” “counsel’s experience in handling
class actions, other complex litigation, and the types of claims
asserted in the action,” “counsel’s knowledge of the applicable
law,” and “the resources that counsel will commit to
representing the class.”  Id. 23(g)(1)(A)(i)-(iv).  A district court
must also ensure that “[c]lass counsel [will] fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the class,” id. 23(g)(4), and
“may consider any other matter pertinent to counsel’s ability” in
order to do so, id. 23(g)(1)(B).
A district court’s inquiry is further aided by broad
discretion to “order potential class counsel to provide
information on any subject pertinent to the appointment” and to
issue “further orders in connection with the appointment.”  Id.
23(g)(1)(C) & (E).  The court may also order the proffered
counsel “to propose terms for attorney’s fees and nontaxable
costs” and to include provisions for such fees and costs “in the
appointing order.”  Id. 23(g)(1)(C)-(D).  After considering the
relevant information and the four factors listed in Rule
23(g)(1)(A), if “one applicant seeks appointment . . . the court
may appoint that applicant only if the applicant is adequate,” and
“[i]f more than one adequate applicant seeks appointment, the
court must appoint the applicant best able to represent the
interests of the class.”  Id. 23(g)(2).
By requiring any “court that certifies a class [to] appoint
class counsel,” Rule 23(g) is made applicable to the appointment
of counsel following both class certifications and class
recertifications.  To our mystification, however, in this case
neither the parties nor the District Court so much as recognized
the existence of the rule.  As a result, the District Court failed to
consider the factors enumerated in Rule 23(g) in its opinion
denying recertification.  We have accordingly reviewed the
provisions of Rule 23(g) at length in order to remind those
handling class actions that its standards now govern the
appointment of, and questions concerning the adequacy of, class
 To that end, we reproduce Rule 23(g) in its entirety here.1
It provides as follows:
(g) Class Counsel.
(1) Appointing Class Counsel. Unless a statute provides otherwise,
a court that certifies a class must appoint class counsel. In
appointing class counsel, the court:
(A) must consider: 
(i) the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating
potential claims in the action; 
(ii) counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other
complex litigation, and the types of claims asserted in the
action; 
(iii) counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law; and
(iv) the resources that counsel will commit to representing
the class;
(B) may consider any other matter pertinent to counsel’s ability
to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class;
(C) may order potential class counsel to provide information on
any subject pertinent to the appointment and to propose terms
for attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs;
(D) may include in the appointing order provisions about the
award of attorney’s fees or nontaxable costs under Rule 23(h);
and
(E) may make further orders in connection with the
appointment.
(2) Standard for Appointing Class Counsel. When one applicant
seeks appointment as class counsel, the court may appoint that
applicant only if the applicant is adequate under Rule 23(g)(1) and
(4). If more than one adequate applicant seeks appointment, the
court must appoint the applicant best able to represent the interests
of the class.
(3) Interim Counsel. The court may designate interim counsel to act
on behalf of a putative class before determining whether to certify
the action as a class action.
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counsel.1
(4) Duty of Class Counsel. Class counsel must fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the class.
6
III.
Ordinarily, a district court’s failure to follow Rule 23(g)’s
dictates would be a sufficient basis on which to vacate the denial
of recertification as an abuse of discretion.  We cannot do so in
this case, however, because plaintiffs – whose new counsel was
unfamiliar with the rule until we raised it at oral argument –
neither objected to the District Court’s error below nor raised it
in plaintiffs’ opening brief on appeal.  Accordingly, any possible
contention that the District Court’s error undermined its order
denying recertification has been waived.  See Chambers ex rel.
Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 186
(3d Cir. 2009); AT&T v. FCC, 582 F.3d 490, 495 (3d Cir. 2009).
We will nevertheless vacate the judgment of the District
Court.  That court’s refusal to recertify the class was premised
on the notion that new counsel, like prior counsel, had
committed numerous errors in prosecuting the case and had
therefore proved inadequate.  The District Court thus concluded
that declining to recertify the class was the best way to protect
the class itself.  While we think that the interests of the class
might, in the circumstances of this case and without reference to
Rule 23(g), provide a potentially appropriate standard against
which to measure counsel’s performance, the District Court did
not actually determine if the interests of the class would be
harmed by recertification.  It instead assumed that the asserted
errors by new counsel would lead to such harm without engaging
in any analysis.  Not every mistake by counsel, however,
inexorably prejudices class interests.  See, e.g., Spoerle v. Kraft
Foods Global, Inc., 253 F.R.D. 434, 442 (W.D. Wis. 2008); see
also Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 458 F.2d 927,
932 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that the proper remedy for
misconduct by class counsel should normally be “disciplinary
action against the lawyer and remedial notice to class
members”).  The District Court thus not only failed to follow
Rule 23(g) but also failed to apply the alternative standard it
7identified for determining the adequacy of counsel to the facts
before it.  Moreover, nothing in the existing record of this case
demonstrates to our satisfaction that new counsel’s performance
necessarily had that effect.
For these reasons, we will vacate the denial of
recertification and remand this case so that the District Court
may again consider plaintiffs’ motion – this time in light of Rule
23(g).
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HARDIMAN, J., dissenting.
I agree with my colleagues that Rule 23(g) requires district
courts to decide whether to certify a class prior to the appointment
of class counsel.  Likewise, I agree that counsel’s  failure to raise
the Rule 23(g) argument constituted waiver.  Unlike the Majority,
however, I would not hold that the District Court abused its
discretion when it denied Appellants’ motion to recertify the class.
When decertifying the class, Judge Hedges found that then-
class counsel harmed the interests of the class in several ways.  For
example, counsel failed to provide class members notice of class
certification.  In addition, counsel’s proposed notice—which was
never sent—did not explain class members’ potential liability under
the fee shifting provisions of ERISA and the WARN Act.  Counsel
also was unaware of court filings, including an order setting the
case for trial, because counsel neither monitored the docket nor
required local counsel to register on the Court’s electronic case
filing system as required by local rule.  As Appellants’ current
counsel concedes, these errors severely prejudiced the interests of
the putative class members.
In light of that severe prejudice, there were two questions
before the District Court when faced with the motion for
recertification: (1) could prior counsel’s errors  be remedied at the
late stage of the litigation; and, if so, (2) did new counsel remedy
the prejudice caused by predecessor counsel.  The District Court
answered both questions in the negative.  In doing so, it
distinguished Korn v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir.
1972), by writing: “The substitution of counsel in this case cannot
remedy the myriad failings that have occurred throughout this
litigation.  In fact, new counsel continues to make the same errors
and exemplify the same deficiencies Judge Hedges cited when he
found that the plaintiff class must be decertified.”  Because the
record supports this conclusion, I would hold that the District Court
did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellants’ motion to
recertify the class.
